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Introduction
In the significant decision of Joffe v R; Stromer v R,1 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (NSWCCA) confirmed that
Contracts for Difference (CFDs) are Division 3 financial products. Both appellants had been convicted of ten counts of
insider trading in contravention of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA), with six of these counts involving the
acquisition of CFDs. In seeking to have their convictions quashed, the appellants argued that CFDs were not Division 3
financial products first through being "credit facilities", and second through being "contracts for the provision of future
services", thereby falling outside the definition of derivatives under the CA. This article examines the NSWCCA's
reasoning in dismissing both grounds of appeal, thereby adding greater certainty to the proper legal characterisation of
CFDs.
Contracts for Difference
CFDs are a highly geared derivative2 product allowing traders to take a position on the change in the value of an
underlying asset or security. They enable traders to take "short" or "long" positions on changes in the value of
underlying assets through entering into swap-style arrangements with the CFD issuer. For instance, a trader entering
into a long position (buying a CFD) on BHP Limited, for example, is betting that the price of the underlying share will
move higher relative to today's price. In contrast, a trader taking a short position (selling a CFD) is betting that the price
will move below today's price.3 CFDs were introduced in Australia in 2000, and their attractiveness to investors has
progressively increased, with a 2012 study estimating that more than 400,000 Australians were involved in CFD
trading.4
In the matter before the NSWCCA, Mr Daniel Joffe and Mr Daniel Stromer (the appellants) had each been charged with
ten separate counts of insider trading contrary to s 1043A CA which took place between June 2006 and January 2007.
Mr Joffe had been charged with procuring the offences in contravention of s 1043A(1)(d) CA, and Mr Stromer had been
charged with acquiring various shares, warrants and CFDs in contravention of s 1043A(1)(c) CA.5 The CFDs in this
case were acquired through CMC Markets Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (CMC), with the terms and legal content applicable to
the trading of these CFDs being outlined in a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) issued by CMC on 1 July 2005 (the
CMC PDS).6
First ground of appeal: CFDs as credit facilities
After some background discussion on the meaning of "Division 3 financial products",7 Allsop P considered whether, as
the appellants argued, the CFDs traded through CMC would constitute "credit facilities" under s 765A(1)(h) CA and the
Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) (the Regulations). Regulation 7.1.06 defines "credit" as meaning "a contract,
arrangement or understanding: under which: payment of a debt owed by one person (a debtor) to another person (a
credit provider) is deferred; or one person (a debtor) incurs a deferred debt to another person (a credit provider)",
including (under subreg (3)(b)(i)) "any form of financial accommodation".8 His Honour then examined the nature and
operation of the CFDs traded by the appellants by considering the terms of the CMC PDS -- with cl 2.1 describing the
operation of CFDs as follows:
[CFDs] allow you to receive most of the benefits of owning a security without having to actually own the security. In other words
you do not take delivery of the security so any difference in the price between when you buy the CFD and when you sell it is
settled in cash. The difference is either profit or loss ... Buying and selling the performance of securities or an index using a CFD is
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similar to buying the actual underlying instrument using a loan ... You could borrow $10,000 from a bank to buy shares. You
would receive the returns from the shares, but would pay interest on the loan to the bank. CFD's combine this process in a single
transaction.
For example, if you want to buy AUD$10,000 worth of Australian shares you will have to deposit with CMC Initial Margin of
AUD$1,000. You will then be allowed to purchase $10,000 worth of Australian share CFDs (based on a 10% initial margin
percentage). The full $10,000 value of the share CFDs will be subject to the share price performance. If you want to keep the share
CFDs overnight you must pay a financing charge on the total nominal value of the position at the Financing Rate. If a share CFD
position is not carried overnight you will pay no financing charge.
As with the underlying securities, share CFDs allow you to benefit from normal market movements. Your open positions are
valued every night at the close of business prices. Profits or losses are credited/debited to your Account each day. Adjustments
relating to corporate actions, such as dividends, bonus issues and reconstructions in respect of the underlying security are also
applied to your Account should they occur.9
The appellants argued that where a customer takes an open position this gives rise to a liability for the price of the
subject of the contract -- with the obligation to pay this price being deferred by either payment of a deposit until a
margin was called for, or until a closing by the acquisition of a "contra" position. They argued the balance of the
purchase price was a debt, and placed emphasis on the explanation in cl 2.1 that "buying and selling the performance of
a securities [sic] or index using a CFD is similar to buying the actual underlying instrument using a loan".10
In rejecting the appellants' argument, his Honour characterised the reference to the "buying and selling the performance
of a securities [sic] or index" as reflecting the nature of the CFD contract, which did not involve the buying or selling of
an asset for a deferred price as in loan arrangements. Rather, the CFD contract involved the opening of a position by
reference to which future fluctuating prices would cause profits or losses by the engagement of payment obligations,
based on the daily comparison between the contract price and the fluctuating price.11
Noting that the CFDs provided for profit to be secured "by reference to fluctuations in the price of the underlying
property or an index", his Honour pointed out that the CFDs did not oblige the delivery of such underlying property.
This was central to the proper characterisation of the CFDs as not being contracts to buy or sell either the underlying
security or any asset of CMC; but rather contracts to pay money by reference to the terms of the contract and
fluctuations in the underlying price against the chosen contract price.12 Barrett JA expressed similar conclusions.13
His Honour also noted that if a CFD position remained open overnight, an amount of overnight interest, whether debited
to a "long party" or credited to a "short party" would be calculated by reference to the total notional value of the CFD
position. However his Honour went on to point out that this overnight interest charge was not a credit charge for money
lent or foregone by either CMC or by the customer. Rather, the total notional value of the CFD position represented the
full potential loss on the face of a position if the underlying asset was without value; and charging interest on the
"notional value" of the CFD position enabled the CMC Product and the risks involved to mimic a fully geared
transaction in relation to the underlying asset.14 Similarly Barrett JA characterised all such "quasi-interest,
quasi-dividends and other like items" as "merely calculation factors to ensure that the financial positions of the parties
were the same as if they had occupied (as creditor, debtor, holder of instruments or otherwise) positions that they did
not in fact occupy at all. The several items only ever reflected an adjustment of the amounts to be paid periodically by
one party to the other".15
His Honour also noted that the CMC PDS emphasised that CMC's "policy [was] not to provide credit facilities on any
accounts". This led his Honour to characterise the objective of the CFDs as not being the lending of money nor deferred
prices for property, but rather enabling the payment or receipt of money by the operation of the contract.16 Barrett JA
similarly concluded the requirement that one party to a CFD contract must pay the other did not at any time arise
because of a loan, forbearance or any other granting of concession, indulgence, deferral or benefit. Rather, rights to
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receive money and obligations to pay arose because the prevailing market price of the underlying instrument, when
factored into calculations dictated by the CMC Agreement in relation to the individual contract, produced a particular
figure and the contractual terms themselves required payment of that amount.17
In their separate judgments both Allsop P and Barrett JA both concluded that because no deferral of the payment of a
debt occurred, and no form of financial accommodation was provided, the CFDs traded by the appellants did not
constitute "credit facilities" within the meaning of the CA and Regulations.18
Second ground of appeal: CFDs as contracts for the provision of future services
The appellants' second ground of appeal was that each individual contract (or CFD) arising from an initiating step taken
by the customer under the CMC Agreement entailed the provision of certain services thereafter by CMC to the
customer. These "services" that the appellants claimed to have been provided by CMC included CMC making available
an equivalent but opposite position upon the customer's request so that the customer might close a position as and when
the customer chose to do so; CMC making payments required to be made by it; and CMC providing electronic systems,
software and other facilities19 necessary to make workable the interaction of the parties envisaged by each individual
contract created pursuant to the CMC Agreement. The appellants argued that individual CFDs were dependent upon the
future provision of such services by CMC for as long as a CFD position remained open.20
Barrett JA acknowledged that CMC's provision of such services was required to facilitate the trading of CFDs by
customers. However his Honour characterised CMC's provision of these services as no more than ancillary or incidental
to the primary purpose and substance of the contractual relationship between CMC and its customers -- this being the
creation, in a synthetic way, of financial results that would have been produced by actual transactions in the market for
the underlying instruments. As CMC's provision of the various "facilitating" services did not form part of that
"substance", his Honour therefore concluded the individual CFDs were not contracts "for" the "future provision of
services"; and were therefore not excluded from the definition of "derivatives" under s 761D(3)(b) CA.21 Allsop P
expressed a similar conclusion.22
Summary and conclusion
With the NSWCCA confirming that CFDs are financial products, the appeal was dismissed. To date two other ASIC
insider trading prosecutions have been concerned with trading involving CFDs. On 2 December 2010, Mr John Hartman
was sentenced in the NSW Supreme Court to four years and six months imprisonment on 25 insider trading related
charges -- 19 of which involved trading in CFDs.23 On 7 December 2011, the NSWCCA reduced the length of
Mr Hartman's sentence to an overall term of three years.24 More recently on 17 April 2013, Mr Mathew Tan was
sentenced in the NSW Local Court to 200 hours of community service and fined $40,000 after pleading guilty to a
charge of acquiring 10,000 CFDs in Macarthur Coal during 2011 while in possession of inside information from his
position as a director of Active Capital management group.25 As the NSWCCA acknowledged, the questions raised in
this appeal were significant both for the operation of the market regulation provisions in Ch 7 of the CA, and in
particular the insider trading provisions in Div 3 of Pt 7.1.26 The NSWCCA's decision has therefore added greater
certainty to the proper characterisation of CFDs under the CA.
[Editorial Note: In May 2013, the HCA refused special leave to appeal the decision in Joffe v R; Stromer v R [2012]
NSW CCA 277; BC201209881.]
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